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1 Introduction
The Group of Thirty, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the
Institute of International Finance (IIF) and central banks in various countries are
concerned with financial market stability in an environment of rapid growth and
increasing complexity of derivatives business1. As a consequence, greater attention
has been paid to the supervision and transparency of derivatives activities in
financial institutions, which are the major players in these markets. Through capital
requirements for market and credit risk exposures as well as disclosure of
meaningful and accurate information, the BIS and the IIF want to impose strong
market discipline upon banks and reduce the risk of bank runs.
Concerning the transparency of derivatives activities, two major issues have
been addressed by people involved in the standards setting process: Firstly, they try
to develop sound accounting standards for derivatives, to provide the foundations
for credible and comparable balance sheets and income statements. Secondly, they
attempt to define disclosure requirements which help the readers of financial
statements to assess the risks resulting from derivatives and trading activities.
This paper explains the current state of the discussion on these issues by
addressing the following questions. Firstly, what are the present accounting
conventions for derivatives in US, UK and German banks and what recommends
the BIS and the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC)? The
analysis distinguishes between accounting for derivatives held or issued for trading
purposes and accounting for non-trading derivatives. Secondly, what supplementary
information on the earnings from derivatives activities as well as their credit risk,
market risk, liquidity risk, the applied risk management system and the risk
philosophy of the company is disclosed in the notes and the management report?
1994 and 1995 annual financial statements of banks are explored to approach this
question. Thirdly, what is the information value of these disclosures? To what
extent do actual disclosures help to assess earnings and risks resulting from the
bank's derivatives activities?
The analysis covers the derivatives reporting conventions in the USA, the
UK and Germany and includes recommendations from the BIS and the IASC.
Germany was chosen as an accounting system that stresses the principle of
prudence and the protection of creditors. The USA and the United Kingdom, on the
other hand, are examples for accounting regimes that emphasise the information
value and economic substance of reporting. The two Anglo-American countries are
included in the study, because the US system is more formal, more explicitly
codified and more regulated than the UK system. Recommendations from the BIS
and the IASC are covered, since they play a major role in the process of
Derivatives are future, forward, swap, or option contracts, or other financial instruments with
similar characteristics.
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international harmonisation of accounting rules and disclosure requirements2. In this
sense, the presented review of disclosure conventions in banks reveals problems of
comparability across institutions and countries as well as the gap between
recommended and actual disclosures.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 illustrates different accounting
rules for derivatives and their effect on earnings as well as supplementary
disclosures that may help to understand the outcome of trading and hedging
activities. The risks resulting from derivatives business are addressed in section 3.
While quantitative disclosures on credit and market risks are emphasised,
qualitative disclosures complement the discussion. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Assessing the Return of Derivatives Activities
In this section, I describe the accounting rules, supplementary disclosures
and problems related to accounting for derivatives. An understanding of these
issues is necessary in order to interpret the outcome of derivatives business and to
estimate the quality and volatility of future earnings of an entity.
2.1 Accounting Methods for Derivatives
Economic profits or losses and reported earnings might be different, for
example because of delayed recognition of items affecting income. Therefore, it is
useful to describe first the earnings impact of different accounting methods for
derivatives.
Mark-to-market valuation measures relevant items at market values3 or fair
values4 and recognises all gains and losses in an entity's financial statements in the
period their prices change. This method best reflects the economic gain or loss of
the reporting period.
IAS reporting rules are applied by more and more Japanese, French, Swiss, and German
banks.
Market value is the amount obtainable from the sale, or payable on the acquisition, of a
financial instrument in an active market (IAS 32, no. 5).
Fair value is the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled, between
knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm's length transaction (IAS 32, no. 5). The best
indicator for the fair value is the market value. In circumstances where it is considered that the
indicative market price may not be achievable, however, the market value should be adjusted
(SORP 1995,p.33-34).
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Unit valuation involves that every contract is accounted for separately with
regard to the imparity principle5. The problem of this approach is, that it does not
give a true and fair view of the financial situation, if derivatives are used for
hedging purposes. Hedging is the risk reduction by the means of risk compensation,
that is certain assets or liabilities are combined with offsetting positions in a way
that the risk of the whole position is lower than the risk of the single asset or
liability. The principle of unit valuation does not reflect these relationships, since
unrealised losses in the hedged item are reported in earnings while unrealised
profits in the hedging instrument are ignored. As a result, losses are reported in
earnings which cannot occur in this amount due to the hedging relationship6. In
response to such anomalies, two methods of hedge accounting have been
developed, which associate changes in the value of the hedging instrument with
changes in the value of the hedged position: the compensatoric valuation with
regard to the imparity principle and deferral hedge accounting.
The compensatoric valuation with regard to the imparity principle applies the
imparity principle not to single items, but to the hedge position as an evaluation
unit.
In the case of deferral hedge accounting, the recognition in earnings on the
derivative is deferred (as assets or liabilities) until the offsetting loss or gain on the
hedged position is recognised. Only when income or expense on the underlying
event is recognised, the offsetting loss or gain on the hedging instrument will be
recorded, whether or not the derivative instrument will be terminated. Neither the
income statement nor the equity section of the firm's balance sheet are affected
until the underlying critical event occurs, at which time the economic effect of both
the underlying event and the related hedges are recorded and reflected in the firm's
financial statement.
The effects of these different accounting methods on reported earnings are
illustrated in figure 1. It is assumed, that changes in value occur in the current
reporting period and that both the hedged item and the hedging instrument mature in
the next reporting period.
5
 The imparity principle - often called the principle of prudence - requires that profits are
reported in earnings only when they are realised, whereas losses are also reported when they
are recognised.
6
 Steiner, Tebroke and Wallmeier (1995), p.534 and Scheffler (1994), p. 124.
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2.2 Accounting Standards and Industry Practices
Derivatives are usually reported in accordance with the way they are used.
The international tendency is to distinguish between derivatives held or issued for
trading purposes and those issued for purposes other than trading. It is presumed
that derivatives are held for trading reasons unless it can be demonstrated that they
constitute non-trading hedges7. There are, however, differences across countries in
respect of the accounting methods applied to trading and non-trading derivatives.
In the USA, of the four basic types of derivatives, only two - forwards and
futures - are directly addressed by existing authoritative accounting rules8. No
specific accounting rules have been established for swaps or options. Therefore,
accounting for a wide range of derivatives activities has been shaped by industry
practices and analogies drawn from accounting rules on forwards and futures9.
7
 See, for example, SFAS 119, no. 30; SORP (1991), no. l l a and SORP (1995), p.41.
8
 Forwards are addressed in SFAS 52 and futures are addressed in SFAS 80.
9
 See US General Accounting Office (1994), p.92.
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The common practice in US banks is as follows: If derivatives are held to
profit from trading activities, mark-to-market accounting is applied, that is realised
and unrealised gains and losses are reported on the income statement as trading
revenue10. Alternatively, if the objective is to hedge financial risks and if the hedge
accounting criteria are fulfilled, changes in the value of derivatives are accounted
for using the same basis of accounting as the underlying asset or liability being
hedged (hedged item)".
If the underlying asset or liability is carried on the balance sheet at current
market value (for example securities available for sale), the derivative product used
as a hedge is also carried at current market value, and any applicable gains or losses
are reflected currently in the income statement. This practice is similar to the
accounting for derivatives used for trading (mark-to-market valuation). But if the
underlying asset or liability is carried on the balance sheet at historical cost, or the
hedged item is reported as an off-balance-sheet item, changes in the market value of
the derivative product are not recorded in income until the income statement effects
of the hedged item are realised in a later transaction (deferral hedge accounting)12.
In the case of interest rate derivatives, for example, realised and unrealised gains
and losses are deferred and amortised as adjustments to interest income or expense
over the lives of the assets or liabilities.
Accounting standards in the United Kingdom and Germany provide an even
less comprehensive framework for accounting for derivatives than US rules.
Consequently, UK and German accountants have to take a pragmatic approach,
guided by the fundamental accounting concepts of the going concern, matching,
prudence and consistency.
Generally, in the United Kingdom any valuation method, including fair
valuation, is permissible, providing it results in a true and fair view13. For financial
institutions, the British Bankers' Association and the Irish Bankers' Federation give
more precise recommendations, which are identical to US industry practices:
trading or speculative transactions should be measured at fair value while hedging
transactions should be valued on an equivalent basis to the related assets, liabilities,
or off-balance-sheet instrument (either mark-to-market or deferral hedge
10
 See for example BankAmerica Corporation Annual Report 1994, p.54; Bank of Boston
Annual Report 1994, p.66; The Bank of New York Annual Report 1994, p.22; J.P.Morgan
Annual Report 1994, p.48.
1
' See for example Bank of Boston Annual Report 1994, p.67; Flemmings Annual Report 1995,
12
 Examples for this accounting practice can be found in BankAmerica Corporation Annual
Report 1994, p.55; The Bank of New York Annual Report 1994, p.22; Chemical Banking
Corporation Annual Report 1994, p.50.
13
 See Schedule 9 of the UK Companies Act, which lays down no particular valuation methods
for derivatives.
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accounting)14. This proposal is supported by the Accounting Standards Board and is
applied in practice15.
Figure 2
Current accounting standards for derivatives by the FASB and the British Bankers'
Association
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In Germany, financial instruments generally have to be valued at the lower of
cost and market with the single security as valuation base (unit valuation)16.
However, hedges can be considered as evaluation unit in certain circumstances'7. In
these cases the imparity principle is applied to this evaluation unit, not to the single
item. Mark-to-market accounting and deferral hedge accounting are not consistent
14
15
16
17
SORP (1991), no. 39.
See Scheffler (1994), p. 145 and, for example, NationsBank Annual Report 1994, p.62-63;
Standard Chartered Annual Report 1994, p.36; HSBC Holdings Annual Report 1994, p.50-
51.
Handelsgesetzbuch (HGB) § 252,1, no. 3.
See KPMG (1995), p. 139-147 for details.
with German accounting principles, because they contradict the imparity principle,
the principle of historical cost accounting and the realisation principle18.
In practice, German banks structure and hedge their trading positions (that is
derivatives and other financial instruments) in product or instrument portfolios and
apply the compensatoric valuation method with regard to the imparity principle to
these portfolios19. Non-trading derivatives are generally valued with the unit
valuation method. If derivatives are used for hedge purposes, they are accounted
according to the method applied to the hedged instrument. In this context, usually
the compensatoric valuation method on micro level is applied20.
The IASC does not prescribe certain accounting rules for trading positions.
According to the proposed exposure draft E 48, however, "a financial asset or
financial liability that is not intended to be held for the long term or to maturity and
is not classified as a hedging instrument should be remeasured at each balance sheet
date and reported at its fair value"21. Therefore, gains or losses of trading positions
are recognised in income as they arise (mark-to-market accounting). For hedge
positions, deferral hedge accounting is the recommended accounting method22.
2.3 The Problem of Unclear Hedge Accounting Standards
The major problem in accounting for non-trading derivatives is to define what
items qualify for hedge accounting. Three principles are widely accepted as the
basis for hedge accounting treatment in most countries23:
(i) The existing asset, liability or off-balance-sheet instrument to be hedged
actually exposes the firm to market risk caused by changes in factors such as
interest or exchange rates.
(ii) The positions included in a hedge transaction must be risk-offsetting in the
sense that the hedging instrument reduces the enterprise's exposure to risk.
(in) The hedge transaction is clearly identified and properly documented, so that a
third party can understand the hedging relationship.
18
 Scheffler(1994), p.226.
19
 See for example Deutsche Bank Annual Report 1994, p.69; Commerzbank Annual Report
1994, p.54; Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechsel-Bank Annual Report 1994, p.82.
20
 See for example Dresdner Bank Annual Report 1994, p.79; Bayerische Vereinsbank Annual
Report 1994, p.68; Commerzbank Annual Report 1994, p.54; Bayerische Hypotheken- und
Wechsel-Bank Annual Report 1994, p.82; BfG Bank Annual Report 1994, p.58.
21
 IAS ED 48, no. 162-163.
22
 IAS ED 48, no. 150-156.
23
 See, for example, US General Accounting Office (1994), p.97; SORP (1995), p.41; IAS ED
48, no. 133; Scheffler (1994), p.155.
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However, the actual application of these hedge criteria is difficult due to the
lack of clear accounting rules on
(i) the degree to which the hedge must correlate to qualify for hedge accounting;
(ii) the question, in which cases hedge accounting methods can be applied on the
portfolio level and not just on the combination of individual assets or liabilities
and their hedging instrument;
(iii) the frequency of reassessment24;
(iv) the application of hedge accounting to anticipated future transactions25.
The described lack of consensus could result in different valuation practices.
Firms can use this situation to smooth out fluctuations in earnings' reports. As a
result, firms with similar economic characteristics might look different on their
financial statements and firms with different economic characteristics might look
similar.
2.4 Supplementary Disclosures in the Notes
2.4.1 The Accounting Method Applied
The existence of alternative accounting treatments for financial instruments
makes it particularly important for banks to disclose their accounting policies. The
Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS)26, the Statements of
Recommended Accounting Practice (SORP)27, the German Commercial Code
(HGB)28 and the IAS29 require such notes.
Knowing the accounting methods applied, readers of financial statements can
conclude that, for example, with the same economic characteristics earnings will be
less volatile with deferral hedge accounting or compensatoric valuation than with
the mark-to-market method or unit valuation.
24
 If a position being hedged changes, or a hedge proves not to be as effective as first envisaged,
hedge transactions should be reclassified as trading (SORP 1995, p.9 and IAS ED 48, no.
165). It is not defined, however, how often positions should be reassessed.
25
 Hedges of anticipated transactions generally qualify for hedge accounting, if it is highly
probable that the future transaction will materialise (IAS ED 48, no. 144; US General
Accounting Office, 1994, p.98-99; SORP, 1995, p.41-43). There is, however, no
comprehensive definition, in what cases future transactions are highly probable.
26
 SFAS 119, no. 8.
27
 SORP (1991), no. 44 f.
28
 HGB §284, 2, no. 1-3.
29
 IAS 32, no 47b and 52.
2.4.2 Fair values
Even more important, however, is the disclosure of fair values and related
carrying amounts, which is demanded by the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB)30 and the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC)3' for all
on- and off-balance sheet financial instruments. Fair values depict the market's
assessment of the present value of net future cash flows embodied in them,
discounted to reflect both current interest rates and the market's assessment of the
risk that the cash flows will not occur. Therefore, they should help investors and
creditors in assessing performance and future cash flows of the company.
Furthermore, fair values reveal hidden reserves. The difference between fair values
and carrying amounts can be used to adjust reported earnings for the mark-to-
market value of financial instruments, because adjusted earnings are more
comparable.
Although they probably best reflect the economic situation, market or fair
values for derivatives are not always an objective and comparable measure. While
the FASB assumes that the market price is the best measure of fair value wherever
a market exists, the British Bankers' Association believes that adjustments have to
be made in circumstances where the market price may not be achievable. This
would apply where the market is illiquid or where the position held is particularly
significant32. Where market prices do not exist, for example for most over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives, fair values have to be estimated with pricing models. As
long as estimating techniques and volatility parameters used for these estimations
are not standardised, differences across banks might be significant. Therefore,
SFAS 107 (no. 10) notes that an entity shall disclose the method and significant
assumptions used to estimate the fair value of financial instruments.
2.4.3 Deferred Gains or Losses
As mentioned before, in the USA and in the United Kingdom, for non-trading
derivatives usually deferral hedge accounting is applied, if they are used for hedging
purposes. Deferral amounts produce earning effects that are divergent from cash
flows. For instance, the amortisation of a deferred gain from a terminated derivative
contract will not produce one whit of cash in the periods it is recognised. If deferred
gains or losses are significant, they may bear on the quality of future earnings.
Furthermore, large amounts of deferred gains or losses from terminated contracts
might be the result of misguided hedging operations, or ones that have been
executed on the fringes of speculation.
The FASB does not require entities to provide information about gains and
losses deferred as a result of hedging existing assets and liabilities. Only for
30
 SFAS 107, no. 10, SFAS 119, no. 10 and 15(b).
31
 IAS 30, no. 19 and IAS 32, no. 77.
32
 SORP 1995, no. 12.
derivatives designated as hedges of anticipated transactions, SFAS 119 (no. l ie )
requires information on the amount and timing with respect to the anticipated
transaction, the amount of hedging gains and losses explicitly deferred, and a
description of events that result in recognition of gains or losses. The British
Bankers' Association and the IASC recommend similar disclosures33.
3 Assessing the Risks of Derivatives Activities
Financial statements should help investors and creditors in evaluating not
only the return, but also the risk of their investment. Risk is defined here as the
financial loss potential. The most important risks to a financial institution are
(i) Credit risk, which is the risk that a counterparty may fail to fully perform its
financial obligations.
(ii) Market risk, which is the exposure to the possibility of financial loss resulting
from unfavourable movements in interest rates, currency rates, equity prices
and commodity prices.
(iii) Liquidity risk, which is the risk that the firm is unable to meet its funding
requirements or execute a transaction at a reasonable price.
(iv) Operational risk, which is the risk that inadequate internal controls, procedures,
human error, system failure, or fraud can result in unexpected losses.
(v) Legal risk, that arises from uncertainty of the enforceability of the firm's claims
to clients and counterparties.
Risks or losses expected with high probability at the balance sheet date
should be reflected in reported earnings34. Unexpected risks, on the other hand, are
not reported in the balance sheet and the profit and loss account. To allow an
assessment of these unexpected risks, financial institutions have to disclose
additional information in the notes and the management report. While disclosures
referred to all major kinds of risk in the 1994 Annual Reports35, quantitative
33
 SORP 1995, p.24 and IAS 32, no. 91
34
 In the case of credit risk, for example, expected risk can be defined as
Credit exposure! * Probability of defaults
with i denoting the relevant counterparties and N the total number of counterparties to the
financial institution (correlation effects are ignored). For this expected credit risk, banks have
to make provisions.
35
 See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and Technical Committee of the International
Organisation of Securities Commissions (1995b) for details.
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disclosures were restricted to credit and market risks. Only these risks are to a
certain extent financial measurable and can therefore be addressed by the bank's
risk management in a formal, structured way. Other risks are not less important, but
they cannot be quantified. Banks employ standard risk avoidance techniques to
mitigate them.
Although only credit, market and liquidity risks of derivatives are addressed
here, readers of financial statements should keep in mind that the total loss potential
of a financial institution depends also on other bank positions and risk categories,
as shown in figure 3. To avoid the bank's insolvency, managers have to guarantee
that at every point in time the total loss potential is covered by reported capital and
hidden reserves.
Figure 3
Composition and coverage of total risk potential
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3.1 Credit Risk
When assessing the credit risk of derivatives, it is appropriate to differentiate
between exchange-traded and OTC instruments. For an exchange-traded derivative,
there is nearly no risk of default, since most exchanges have been very successful in
organising trading to ensure that their contracts are always honoured36. For the OTC
market, however, the no-default assumption is less defensible. Accordingly, the
following discussion on credit risk pertains primarily to OTC contracts.
3.1.1 Credit Risk Measurement
(a) Credit Exposure
The credit exposure of derivatives is different from the exposure of loans.
Firstly, not the principal, but the replacement costs are at risk. Secondly, default on
derivatives require more than one condition to exist simultaneously: The
counterparty must be in financial distress and the market value of the contract to the
financial institution must be positive. Thirdly, at any point in time, the bank is
exposed not only to the current values of derivatives but also to potential changes in
values.
An institution's current credit exposure from derivative contracts is best
measured as the positive mark-to-market replacement cost of all derivative products
on a counterparty by counterparty basis, taking account of any legally enforceable
bilateral netting agreements, collaterals and other credit enhancements37.
Potential credit exposure can be defined as the exposure of the contract that
may be realised over its remaining life due to movements in the rates or prices
underlying the contract38. Potential credit exposure depends on the volatility of the
36
 Both futures and options exchanges typically mark exposures to market each day. In the case
of futures exchanges, members' exposures to the clearing house are eliminated each day
through margin payments. In the case of options exchanges, clearing house exposures to
written options are fully collateralised (Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and IOSCO,
1995a, p.7).
37
 Netting on a bilateral basis - which is usual for OTC-derivatives, has the following effect:
positive mark-to-market values on transactions for one counterparty are offset by negative
mark-to-market values for the same counterparty, reducing the overall credit risk exposure of
the financial institution. Collaterals, guarantees and other credit enhancements reduce credit
exposure only to the extent of their quality and marketability. Therefore, to calculate actual
exposure to credit risk, the market value of relevant collateral should be subtracted from the
netted credit exposure. It has to be considered, however, that collateral held by an institution
in excess of its netted credit exposure to a counterparty would not reduce current credit
exposure below zero. It could only reduce potential credit exposure (see Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision and IOSCO, 1995a, p.9).
38
 See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and IOSCO (1995a), p.8.
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instrument in question and its remaining time to maturity39. To estimate potential
credit exposure, entities have to generate a probability distribution of the present
value of the replacement cost of the portfolio40.
Credit exposure is a measure of the maximum credit loss, since it is assumed
that all counterparties to the financial institution default immediately in the case of
current credit exposure or at the end of the holding period in the case of potential
credit exposure. A more precise measure of the loss potential resulting from credit
risk can be obtained when the probability of default is also taken into consideration.
(b) Probability of Default
As mentioned above, expected credit losses should be reflected in earnings.
To calculate unexpected losses, on the other hand, one needs to estimate the
distribution of future defaults. The loss potential on the transaction level could then
be expressed as
Potential credit exposure * Potential default rate,
where the potential default rate is the probability of default at the end of the holding
period, that is not exceeded with a certain probability. In the case of derivatives, the
probability of default and its distribution depend on the following factors:
(i) The creditworthiness of the counterparty: The more creditworthy the
counterparty, the lower the probability of default.
(ii) The maturity of the transaction: the longer the maturity of the derivative
financial instrument, the more likely it is that the firm's credit quality will
deteriorate, that is the higher the probability of default.
(iii) The volatility of the underlying financial price: The more volatile the
underlying financial price, the more likely it is that there will be a price
movement sufficiently large to put the counterparty into financial distress
(whenever the financial instrument is not or not adequately used for hedging
purposes)41.
39
 With more time remaining until contract expiration, the bank's potential exposure increases,
that is, the possible deviation in the financial price from its level at origination increases
(Smithson and Smith 1995, p.439-440).
40
 This can be d o n e by simulation analysis, i.e. mult iple scenar ios are genera ted by means of a
statistical model . At each point in t ime under a given scenar io , the mark - to -marke t value of
each transaction in the portfolio is computed, and the replacement cost of the entire portfolio
is calculated, taking account of netting provisions where applicable. This process is repeated
for a large number of scenarios to generate a probability distribution of the present value of
the replacement cost of the portfolio at each point in time (Smithson and Smith, p.451).
41
 See Smithson and Smith (1995), p.462-463.
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(c) Concentration Risk
In order to calculate the credit loss potential of a financial institution,
exposures and potential default rates have to be aggregated, taking risk reducing
diversification effects into account. Therefore, the composition of the bank's
portfolio is essential for evaluating credit risk. Concentration of credit exposure to
specific borrowers or counterparties within specific business sectors or regions is
generally considered - other factors being equal - to indicate a greater credit loss
potential.
Currently, only a few banks are able to calculate potential credit losses
associated with derivatives and trading activities, because calculations are very
complicated. Simulations involve numerous assumptions and consider a number of
variables, including duration of the credit exposure, default probabilities,
volatilities, collateral values, and expected recovery rates in the event of default, as
well as the diversification across counterparties, industries, and geographic regions
of the bank's global credit portfolio.
3.1.2 The BIS Recommendations for Credit Risk Disclosures
A guiding principle for future developments in derivatives disclosure is the
recommendation from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). In the Fisher
Report (1994), the BIS proposes the following disclosures:
Table 1
BIS recommendations on credit risk disclosures
Current credit
exposures
Net
replacement
values when
close-out
netting
arrangements
are in place,
otherwise gross
replacement
values
Likelihood of
default
Braking down
current
exposures by
credit quality
and/or
counterparty
type.
Potential future
exposures
Braking down
current
exposures by
maturity and
giving some
indication of the
firm's estimate
of potential
future credit
exposure.
Management
performance
• A measure of actual
losses over the reporting
period;
• a measure of actual
losses relative to capital
supporting the activity in
which the losses
dnci l rr^H •
• variability of credit
exposures over time -
high, low, average gross
or net replacement values
over the reporting period.
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Surprisingly, a deviation between OTC and exchange traded derivatives is
not explicitly recommended by the BIS.
3.1.3 Credit Risk Disclosure Practice
(a) USA
In the USA, there are extensive regulatory disclosure requirements on the
credit risk of derivatives. Entities have to disclose the following information:
(i) The notional principal amount of financial instruments, disaggregated by their
category (class of financial instrument, business activity, risk or other category
that is consistent with the management of those instruments)42.
(ii) The maximum accounting loss resulting from financial instruments with off-
balance-sheet credit risk, disaggregated by category of financial instrument43.
Enforceable netting agreements can be considered according to FASB
Interpretation 39 (no. 5).
(iii) The entity's policy for requiring collateral or other security on financial
instruments it accepts and a description of collateral on instruments presently
held44.
(iv) The nature and terms of the financial instruments and a discussion of their
credit and market risk45.
(v) Information about significant concentrations of credit risk from an individual
counterparty or groups of counterparties (for example the maximum accounting
loss for each concentration)46.
(vi) Average fair values of the financial instruments held or issued for trading
purposes, distinguishing between assets and liabilities47.
The question is, how accurate credit risk can be assessed with the minimum
information required by the FASB. Since derivatives are usually recorded marked
to market in the balance sheet, the maximum accounting losses are similar to the
gross positive market values. If enforceable netting agreements are taken into
consideration, accounting losses are an acceptable measure of current credit
42
 SFAS 119, no. 8.
43
 SFAS 105, no. 18a and SFAS 119, no. 14b.
44
 SFAS 105, no. 18b.
45
 SFAS 119, no. 8.
46
 SFAS 105, no. 20 and no 101.
47
 SFAS 119, no. 10a.
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exposure. However, average fair values are a better indicator for the credit risk
exposure of derivatives than end-of-period exposures, since positions typically
fluctuate, and the ending balance may not always be representative of the range of
balances during a period. Since companies want to present to their shareholders the
best possible picture of financial beauty, the level of derivatives may even have
been managed down to show as little year-end exposure as possible. Therefore, the
requirement of average fair value disclosures of derivative financial instruments in
the trading book increases the information value considerably.
However, SFAS 119 also has some drawbacks. First, entities do not have to
differentiate between exchange traded and OTC derivatives. Second, potential
credit exposures do not have to be disclosed. Third, derivatives counterparty credit
quahty is not reported and the effect of collaterals and other credit enhancements do
not have to be quantified. Fourth, lack of quantitative thresholds for determining
reportable concentrations of credit risk makes this disclosure dependent on
management's judgement. Finally, no information on the management performance
has to be disclosed.
In their 1994 and 1995 Annual Reports, only a few US banks and security
firms disclosed significant information on credit risk going beyond that required by
48
current accounting standards
(b) United Kingdom
Whereas disclosure requirements in the USA are applicable by all
companies, Britain has special Statements of Recommended Accounting Practice
(SORP) for banks.
The "SORP - Off-Balance-Sheet Instruments" (no. 44b) requires a table
providing a breakdown of off-balance-sheet contract amounts, disaggregated by
broad transaction groupings (for example exchange rate related contracts, interest
rate related contracts, index related contracts etc.). In respect of interest and
exchange rate related contracts, the credit risk weighted amount and the net
replacement cost should also be given49. Moreover, any significant concentrations
48
 Exceptions are, for example, J.P.Morgan (Annual Report 1994, p.58 and 1995, p.57) and
Morgan Stanley (Annual Report 1994, p.66), providing a breakdown of their derivatives
credit exposure according to credit ratings or industry groups. Bankers Trust (Annual Report
1994, p.67 and 1995, p.84) split their fair value disclosures in OTC and exchange-traded
financial instruments. HSBC Holdings pic (Annual Report 1995, p.47) showed the
replacement cost of derivatives by residual maturities.
49
 Credit risk weighted amounts are calculated according to regulations by the banking
supervision and take into consideration current and potential credit exposures as well as the
counterparty's probability of default. Net replacement cost is the cost of replacing all
transactions that have a positive fair value and should be calculated by netting transactions
with a positive value against those with a negative value to the extent that the bank has a legal
right to offset.
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of off-balance-sheet items must be disclosed. Large banks in the UK followed more
or less detailed this recommendation50.
/'In their discussion paper and exposure draft "Statement of Recommended
Accounting Practice - Derivatives" (p.44), the British Bankers' Association and the
Irish Bankers' Federation recommend additional disclosures on derivatives for
reporting periods beginning on or after 23 December 1995:
(i) Banks should provide an analysis of counterparty credit risk for all transactions
based on net replacement cost divided, at a minimum, between financial and
non-financial institutions. Further information about counterparty types
considered particularly relevant to their operations are recommended. This may
involve, for example, the provision of an analysis based on a geographical
division, or a breakdown of OECD/non-OECD counterparties, or the provision
of information based on internal credit ratings. Broad counterparty groupings
are preferred to credit rating agency categories as agency ratings do not cover
all the counterparties with which a bank will do business.
(ii) Banks should also provide a maturity analysis of exposures arising from its
derivatives. This should be based on the net present values of all expected
future cash flows relating to its derivatives across maturity bandings based on a
remaining life of one year or less, one to five years, and five years or over. In
order to provide information indicative of counterparty credit risk, the maturity
analysis should be given for both notional principal amounts and the net
replacement cost.
Banks did not apply the new standard in their 1995 Annual Reports. However, once
it is implemented, readers of financial statements can assess the current credit
exposure and significant credit concentrations. The maturity analysis of exposures
and the breakdown of counterparty's exposure according to counterparty groupings
helps to evaluate the probability of default of counterparties to the financial
institution.
(c) Germany
In Germany, there are no legal disclosure requirements on the credit risk of
derivative financial instruments. The Federal Association of German Banks (1995),
however, recommends a reporting scheme, that is based on an IIF proposal.
Separate disclosure for OTC and exchange traded products in this scheme
increases the information value considerably. The notional amounts of different
50
 See, for example, HSBC Holdings Annual Report 1994, p.41-42; Lloyds Bank Directors'
Report and Accounts, p.29; Schroders Annual Report 1994, p.39, StandardChartered Annual
Report 1994, p.66.
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product types by remaining maturity give some insight in the extent of involvement
in derivatives activities, but do not help much in assessing credit risk.
Scheme I
Derivatives business volumes as at (date) in millions of DM
Interest rate contracts
OTC
products
Traded
products
FRAs
Interest rate swaps (single currency)
Interest rate options (bought)
Interest rate options (sold)
Other interest rate contracts
Interest rate futures
Interest rate options
Foreign exchange contracts
OTC
products
Traded
products
FX forwards
Cross currency swaps
FX options (bought)
FX options (sold)
Other FX contracts
FX futures
FX options
Equtiy / index contracts
OTC
products
Traded
products
Equity / index swaps
Equity / index options (bought)
Equity / index options (sold)
Other equity / index contracts
Equity / index futures
Equity / index options
Other contracts
OTC
Products
Traded
products
Precious metals contracts
Other Contracts
Futures
Options
Notional amount
Remaining life
< l y 1-5 y > 5 y Total
Cre-
dit
risk
The credit risk in the proposed scheme can be quantified in two ways: One
option is to apply the credit equivalent defined in the solvency directive by the
European Union51. The advantage of this approach is, that the disclosed number
reflects current and potential credit exposure. There are two methods to calculate
51 See solvency directive 1989, which was incorporated in German law in 1990 (Deutsche
Bundesbank, Die neuen Grundsatze I und I a iiber das Eigenkapital der Kreditinstitute,
Sonderdruck Nr. 2 a, June 1990.)
18
the credit equivalent: the mark-to-market method and the remaining life method. In
the case of the mark-to-market method, for example, potential credit exposure is
considered by an add-on, which is added to current replacement costs and depends
on the time to maturity and the risk category (interest rate risk, foreign exchange
risk and other price risks). There is, however, a lack of comparability of this
number. It depends on the method used to calculate the credit equivalent and on
supervisory regulations, which might be different from country to country.
Therefore, the Federal Association of German Banks and the IIF prefer the second
option, that is the disclosure of market values. They argue that market values are
the only objective measure of credit risk. The probability of default can be assessed
by Scheme II.
Scheme II
Counterparty structure in derivatives business as at (date) in millions of DM
Type of counterparty
OECD governments
OECD banks
OECD financial institutions
Other undertakings, private persons
Non-OECD governments
Non-OECD banks
Non-OECD financial institutions
Credit risk
The Federal Association of German Banks notes that the alternative proposal
of the IIF, based on ratings, is less informative: external ratings are often not
available, even for important German companies and, owing to their subjective
character, internal ratings as classification criteria would severely restrict the
comparability of the data given.
The classification by product (Scheme I) should only contain gross amounts
because, owing to the widespread multi-product agreements, the effects of netting
agreements cannot be meaningfully allocated to types of product. The counterparty
classification (Scheme II), on the other hand, should take account of enforceable
netting agreements52.
All large banks in Germany provided in their 1994 and 1995 Annual Reports
on a voluntary basis exactly the schemes proposed by the Federal Association of
German Banks. In Scheme I, they complied with the recommendation from the
Federal Association of German banks and disclosed gross replacement costs. In
Scheme II, on the other hand, the majority of banks reported gross replacement
costs and did not take enforceable netting agreements into account. In addition to
52
 Federal Association of German Banks (1995), p.9.
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the proposed schemes, some banks showed the credit equivalent amount of their
derivatives53.
(d) IASC
The IASC disclosure requirements for the credit risk of derivatives
correspond to US rules54. The only striking difference is, that not the maximum loss
of book value, but the maximum credit loss has to be disclosed.
3.2 Market Risk
3.2.1 Market Risk Measurement
There is no consensus on a single best method of measuring market risk
exposures. However, Value-at-risk (VAR) concepts are becoming widely used in
financial institutions. VAR is derived from statistical estimates of the losses a
portfolio could experience, due to changes in underlying prices, over a given
holding period and for a given confidence interval55.
The beauty of this method is that all market risk is reduced to a common
measure that shows likely declines in portfolio value that will be exceeded some
proportion of the time. Ideally, banks should be able to aggregate interest rate risk,
foreign exchange risk and other market risks to one VAR number, taking
correlation effects between different instruments and risk categories into account.
Such a number would describe the market risk exposure of the entire firm. Looking
at the market risk of derivatives in isolation would not give a true view of their
exposure, since risk compensating effects between on- and off-balance-sheet
instruments are ignored. In practice, most financial institutions are not able, yet, to
calculate the market risk exposure of the entire firm level. However, they form
portfolios along the lines determined by the bank's organisational structure and
measure and manage the risks of these portfolios. Most common is the application
of VAR techniques in trading portfolios. The market risk of non-trading positions is
usually measured differently and managed separately. Most banks still apply
conventional asset/liability management techniques to these positions.
53
 See, for example, Bayerische Vereinsbank (Annual Report 1995, p.95), Dresdner Bank
(Annual Report 1995, p.57), Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank (Annual Report
1995, p.92).
54
 See IAS 32, no. 66, 74 and 76 for details.
55
 The holding period refers to the time interval over which changes in value of a given portfolio
is assessed.
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3.2.2 The BIS Proposals for Market Risk Disclosures
The BIS (1994) believes that the information stemming from internal risk
management systems should be conveyed to the users of financial statements in
summary form. Although many banks may not yet have sophisticated risk
management information systems that cover the entire firm, they should draw upon
information about the portfolios for which risk management systems exist.
In the Fisher Report (1994), the BIS gives some examples for reasonable
disclosures on market risk. These examples can be classified in information on the
loss potential, expressed in VAR, and information on the risk management
performance.
(a) Value at Risk Disclosures
According to the BIS, for the relevant portfolios, firms should disclose the
high, low, and average VAR, for holding periods of one-day, and two-weeks, that
occurred during the reporting period.
High, low, and average VAR's are required, since the VAR at the balance
sheet date does not provide appropriate insights about market risk due to the speed
with which positions in derivatives and other instruments can be altered.
Furthermore, banks tend to close out open positions at the end of a reporting
period, with the result that end-of-period VAR's are significantly below average
VAR's56.
This proposed disclosure would convey information about the riskiness of the
firm's portfolio during the reporting period, and in the case of firms whose
portfolios change over the reporting period, the disclosures would indicate the
degree to which the firms' risk profiles change. The use of holding periods longer
than one-day provide an indication of the portfolio's exposure to market liquidity
risk, that is the risk that positions cannot be closed out when desired.
For firms that do not use VAR, a measure of actual outcomes could also reveal
riskiness. The histogram of daily changes in portfolio value over the reporting
period would be an example for such a disclosure.
56
 There might be two reasons for this effect: Firstly, financial institutions tend to close out open
positions over the Christmas holidays and the New Years Day. If the reporting year is identical
with the calendar year, the ending exposure will therefore be below average. Secondly,
companies want to present their shareholders the best possible picture of their financial beauty.
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(b) Disclosures on the Risk Management Performance
In addition to the risk profiles, the BIS requires some information that allows
an assessment of the firm's capacity to manage its exposures to market risk. This
could be achieved by disclosing, for example
(i) a histogram of the ratio of daily variation in portfolio value to daily VAR;
(ii) the five or ten largest one-day declines in portfolio values together with the
one-day prior estimate of the one-day VAR;
(iii) a chart in which daily VAR is plotted against the daily change in portfolio
value (one variable on the y-axis and the other on the x-axis).
This information is particularly important for trading portfolios, because the
unpredictability of market prices and the unstable nature of correlations between
different prices implies that trading outcomes will be variable. For this reason, the
disclosure of only average changes in portfolio market value is not sufficient. Some
measure of extreme outcomes, or the tails of the frequency distribution of changes
in portfolio value, are required for an assessment of the firm's ability to manage its
risk within a range determined by its appetite for risk.
Over time, successful risk management would tend to keep the frequency of
large declines in portfolio value below a level consistent with a firm's appetite for
risk. VAR could provide information about a firm's appetite for risk in the
management of that portfolio. The comparison of the VAR with the frequency of
the declines in portfolio value that exceed VAR is, therefore, a measure of risk
management performance. Superior risk management would tend to keep the
frequency of large losses below the frequency associated with the confidence level
of the VAR.
In order to interpret the quantitative data, the parameters of the VAR figures
have to be disclosed. In addition, the relationship of the portfolio about which
quantitative disclosures are made to the rest of the firm should be made clear.
3.2.3 Implementation of the BIS Recommendations
Currently, disclosures on VAR and risk management performance are not
compulsory in the USA, the UK and Germany. The reason is that some banks do
not yet have the measurement or reporting system to support that disclosure.
However, the FASB and the British Bankers' Association recommend quantitative
disclosures similar to those proposed by the BIS57. The Federal Association of
German Banks (1996), on the other hand, believes that market risk disclosures
should be restricted to the most important information, in order to guarantee a well-
57
 FASB 119, no. 12-13 and SORP (1995), p.38 and p.44.
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balanced relationship between commercial bank and trading business disclosures. It
recommended to disclose only end-of-period VAR numbers for trading activities (if
they are material) according to broad risk categories, as demonstrated in scheme
IIP. .
Scheme III
Market risk disclosure as recommended by the Federal Association of German
Banks
Group market risk potential
(value-at-risk) at (date)
in Mill. DM
Interest rate related transactions
Foreign exchange related transactions
Stock and index related transactions
Other transactions
Total
These numbers should include both cash and derivative financial instruments
in the trading portfolio and should be calculated on the basis of the parameters
proposed by the BIS for market risk capital requirements: a 99% one-tailed
confidence interval, a ten-day holding period and an observation period of at least
one year59. To ensure comparability, banks should explain to what extent
correlations are considered. The striking disadvantage of this proposal is, that end-
of-period VAR figures are published. As noted before, these numbers might not be
representative for the reporting period.
Opponents of VAR disclosures argue that they are not comparable across
banks and might therefore be misguiding. Styblo Beder (1995) showed that VAR's
are extremely dependent on the time horizon, data base, correlation assumptions,
confidence level, and methodology. She applied eight common VAR methodologies
to three hypothetical portfolios and shows VAR results varying by more than 14
times for the same portfolio. This is because VAR does not provide certainty or
confidence of outcomes, but rather expectation of outcomes based on a specific set
of assumptions.
In the course of time, however, divergence between VAR figures might
decrease. Firstly, there is growing convergence among the major financial
intermediaries in the basic analytic tools used for internal risk management.
Secondly, the basic parameters suggested by the BIS might become an
58
 See Federal Association of German Banks (1996), p.65.
59
 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (1996), p.45.
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internationally accepted standard for calculating the VAR disclosures. Until such a
standard is achieved, readers of financial statements have to look at the
methodology and the input parameters used, in order to interpret VAR disclosures.
In the 1994 Annual Reports, VAR disclosures were relatively common in US
banks, but exceptional in German and UK institutions60. In 1995, however, all
German banks with significant trading activities disclosed the end-of-period VAR
of their trading portfolio calculated with the BIS parameters (Scheme III)61. In UK
banks, on the other hand, VAR disclosures are still not common yet.
Major US banks followed the BIS recommendation and disclosed high, low and
average VAR as well as some information on the risk management performance62.
However, the VAR figures of US banks are less comparable than those of German
banks, because US institutions applied different input parameters. For example,
some used a 99%, others a 95% confidence level to compute VAR. While market
risk disclosures referred primarily to the trading activities, some US banks were
able to include non-trading activities in their calculations63.
3.2.4 Other Disclosures on Market Risk
While the quantitative disclosures proposed above are voluntary, there are
also some compulsory disclosures that might help to assess market risk.
In the USA, firms have to provide a discussion of the market risk of off-
balance sheet instruments. However, it is not specified how this disclosure should
look like64. Furthermore, for their 1995 financial statements, banks are required to
disaggregate information on fair values and contractual amounts of derivatives
segregated by category of instrument and by purpose for which they are held65.
In Germany and the UK, banks must only report the types of derivative
business they have concluded, classified by currency-based, interest-based and
60
 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and IOSCO (1995b).
61
'See, for example, Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechsel-Bank (Annual Report 1995, p.44),
Dresdner Bank (Annual Report 1995, p.41), Deutsche Bank (Annual Report 1995, p.33).
Commerzbank (Annual Report 1995, p.22) also showed the average VAR of the trading
portfolio and the outcome of two stress scenarios.
62
 See, for example, Bank America (Annual Report 1995, p.38-39), Bankers Trust New York
Corporation (Annual Report 1995, p.44-46) and J.P.Morgan (Annual Report 1995, p.17-19).
63
 See Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and IOSCO (1995b) for details.
64
 SFAS 105, no. 17b.
65
 SFAS 119, no. 8 and 9.
24
other transactions, and state for these categories whether a substantial portion
relates to trading business and a substantial portion to hedging business66.
In their exposure draft for a Statement of Recommended Accounting Practice
- Derivatives, the British Bankers' Association recommends to supplement the
breakdown between trading and non-trading business and risk categories with
quantitative information. Both the notional principal amounts and, in respect of
trading instruments, the gross positive and negative fair values should be given67.
What information on market risk can be derived from these disclosures?
Contractual amounts and market values do not reveal much about market risk.
Higher notional amounts or market values in derivatives do not indicate a higher
market risk, because leverage effects of derivatives and compensatoric effects
within the portfolio are ignored. This does not mean, however, that they are
worthless. In the case of non-trading derivatives, one could try to link notional
principal amounts of derivatives to the principal or face amounts of the instruments
with which they are associated, for example between a particular debt issue and a
swap. This is because one would expect to see a one-for-one relationship between
the amount of the debt principal and the amount of the swap principal.
Separate disclosure of trading and non-trading activities is insofar useful, as
market risks usually exist only for open positions, not for hedged positions. Non-
trading positions are usually held to reduce risk, whereas trading derivatives usually
increase total risk of the company. Fair values of non-trading derivatives can be
used to verify this statement: If banks use non-trading derivatives to manage risk,
then the gains and losses on these derivatives should be negatively related to the
gains and losses reported for on-balance sheet financial instruments.
The International Accounting Standards are very general in their disclosure
requirements on market risk: For each class of financial asset, financial liability and
equity instrument, an enterprise should disclose information about the extent and
nature of the financial instruments, including significant terms and conditions that
may affect the amount, timing and certainty of future cash flows. Terms and
conditions may include, for example, the principal amount, the date of maturity,
expiry or execution or the currency in which receipts and payments are required.
Furthermore, it is important to disclose hedging relationships68.
Interest rate risk is addressed separately. Entities should disclose for all
financial assets and liabilities, the contractual repricing or maturity dates, whichever
dates are earlier, and effective interest rates, where applicable. Information about
maturity or repricing dates indicates the length of time for which interest rates are
fixed and information about effective interest rates indicates the levels at which they
66
 See SORP (1995), p. 13 for the UK and § 36 Statutory Order on Banks' Accounts for
Germany.
67
 SORP (1995), p.44.
68
 IAS 32, no. 47-55.
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are fixed. A bank may disclose, for example, separate groupings of the carrying
amounts of financial instruments contracted to mature or be repriced in certain time
bands (within one month, one month to three months etc.). The IASC notes that
disclosures of this information provide financial statement users with a basis for
evaluating the interest rate price risk to which an enterprise is exposed and thus the
potential for gain or loss69. For trading books, however, this kind of presentation is
not very helpful, since positions change frequently and the risk of positions with
non-linear properties like options cannot be assessed in this way.
3.3 Liquidity Risk
There are two types of liquidity risk that can be associated with derivative
instruments:
(i) Funding risk, which is the risk that derivatives positions place adverse funding
and cash flow pressures on an institution.
(ii) Market liquidity risk, which is the risk that a position cannot be eliminated
quickly by either liquidating the instrument or by establishing an offsetting
position70.
In normal market conditions, funding risk is not significant, since banks have
ample resources for growth and recourse to additional liabilities for unexpectedly
high asset growth. Accordingly, attempts to analyse liquidity risk as a need for
resources to facilitate growth, or outstanding credit lines are of little relevance to
risk management. Liquidity risk that does present a real challenge is the need for
funding when a sudden crisis arises. What is required for these cases is an analysis
of funding demands under a series of ,,worst case" scenarios. These include the
liquidity needs associated with a bank specific shock, such as a severe loss, and a
crisis that is system wide71. Since stress scenarios are not standardised at all,
quantitative disclosure on this risk is not even discussed, yet. However, the capital
position of the financial institution is integral for assessing its funding risk.
Market liquidity risk, on the other hand, is directly relevant for assessing the
loss potential resulting from derivatives activities. This kind of risk should be
incorporated in VAR via the holding period. The appropriate holding period
depends on the speed with which a position's risk profile could be modified, if
necessary by liquidation. The holding period, therefore, depends on the instrument
69
 IAS 32, no. 56-65.
70
 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and IOSCO (1995a), p. 10.
71 Santomero (1995), p.23-24.
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in question, the size of the position and the market conditions in which the position
is run down or liquidated. A correct, but impractical approach would consider
different holding periods for different positions. The common practice to use a
certain holding period of one or ten trading days for all positions, however, does not
correctly reflect market liquidity risk: the risk of relatively liquid positions is
overstated and the risk of comparably illiquid positions is understated.
To understand market liquidity risk better, investors would benefit from a
picture of the bank's position in certain markets as compared to the aggregate size
of this market. This is particularly important for OTC derivatives. It may be difficult
to unwind such a position in an appropriate time frame because of its size, the
availability of suitable counterparties, or the narrowness of the market. OTC
contracts can include fundamental elements of market risk that may not be easily
replicated using standardised exchange-traded contracts or other OTC
instruments72. In this sense, the proposal by the Federal Association of German
Banks (scheme I) provides useful information, since notional amounts of exchange
traded and OTC instruments are published by risk category, by maturity and by
product. In the USA and the UK, separate disclosure of OTC contract volumes is
not required.
3.4 Qualitative Disclosures
The example Barings, where the trader Leeson lost more than the bank's
proprietary capital explains, why inadequate internal controls and human error
(operational risks) are often considered to be the most important sources of risk.
These risks cannot be quantified. However, qualitative disclosures on the risk
management and risk control systems as well as the risk philosophy of the entity
might help to assess the loss potential resulting from derivatives activities. Moody's,
for example, bases 25 per cent of its volatility rating for funds on VAR and the
remaining 75 per cent on qualitative factors73.
Being aware of the information value of qualitative disclosures, the FASB
demands from US entities to explain what they are trying to accomplish with non-
trading derivatives. They should disclose their objectives for holding or issuing
derivative financial instruments, the context needed to understand those objectives,
and their strategies for achieving those objectives74.
More comprehensive discussions requires the British Bankers' Association75:
Banks should disclose
72
 Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and IOSCO (1995a), p. 10-11.
73
 Styblo Beder (1995), p.23.
74
 S F A S 119 , n o . l l a .
75
 SORP (1995), p. 14 and 43.
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(i) an explanation of the use of derivatives;
(ii) a description of the trading activities including the types of instrument traded
and policies for limiting and monitoring the associated risks;
(iii) a discussion of the bank's risk management policies, including those for
controlling credit and market risk, with reference to supervisory requirements
and policies on collateral and netting; and a
(iv) discussion of how derivatives are used in asset and liability management.
Similarly, the Federal Association of German Banks recommends to explain
the risk philosophy and the risk control process76.
An investigation by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and the
IOSCO (1995b) shows, that in their 1994 Annual Reports most US, UK and
German banks actually provided the proposed qualitative disclosures.
Such information might give some idea of management's overall willingness
to take risk and whether there are clear lines of responsibility for managing risk,
adequate systems for measuring risk, appropriately structured limits on risk taking,
effective internal controls and a comprehensive risk-reporting process.
4 Summary and Concluding Remarks
The major findings of this review of derivatives reporting in banks are as
follows: The accounting conventions for derivatives indicate the international
tendency to mark all trading activities - including derivatives - to market.
Accounting for non-trading derivatives, on the other hand, appears to be one of the
least standardised areas of financial accounting. Due to the lack of clearly defined
accounting rules, industry practices have established. Usually, derivatives
transactions designated for hedging are valued on an equivalent basis to the related
assets, liabilities or off-balance sheet instrument, but it is not clearly defined what
transactions qualify for hedge accounting treatment. Therefore, there is scope for
income smoothing, making earnings less comparable.
In the international context, German accounting rules for derivatives hold an
exceptional position. Since the mark-to-market method is not consistent with
German accounting principles, banks apply the compensatoric valuation on
portfolio level to their trading positions. For hedge positions in asset-liability-
management, the same accounting concept is usually employed on a one-to-one
basis.
Supplementary notes help to interpret reported earnings. Most important in
this context are disclosures of fair values together with carrying amounts, where
derivatives are not marked to market. With this information readers of financial
76
 Federal Association of German Banks (1995), p.6.
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statements can adjust reported earnings to make them more comparable across
different financial institutions. The FASB and the IASC require this disclosure,
while it is voluntary in the UK and Germany.
Concerning disclosures on the risk potential of derivatives, the BIS
recommends extensive disclosures. The key element of the BIS proposal is, that
disclosed information should be based upon methodologies firms use internally for
assessing their risks. Disclosure conventions in the USA, the UK and Germany tie
on the BIS recommendations, but they are less comprehensive. Only the USA have
broad regulatory disclosure requirements on the risks of derivatives. In the UK and
Germany, on the other hand, most disclosures are voluntary, based on proposals by
the British Bankers' Association and the Federal Association of German Banks,
respectively.
In the 1994 and 1995 Annual Reports, credit risk disclosures focus primarily
on current credit exposure and increasingly on counterparty credit quality and
concentrations. Concerning market risk, more and more banks disclose the VAR of
their trading books. Although actual disclosures on the credit and market risk of
derivatives improved considerably, their information value is still limited. First of
all, there is a lack of comparability, because US standards and the
recommendations by the British Bankers' Association leave financial statement
preparers with substantial flexibility in their derivatives disclosures. The proposals
by the Federal Association of German Banks, on the other hand, more clearly
defines what should be disclosed at minimum and what layout should be chosen.
This helps readers of financial statements considerably in understanding and
comparing reported numbers. A drawback of German disclosure practices is, that
banks usually report end-of-period risks, which might not be representative for the
reporting period. In the USA, average and high/low credit and market risks are
more common. Finally, information on the risk management performance, that is the
firm's ability to manage its risk within a range determined by its appetite for risk, is
still exceptional. Such disclosures in conjunction with the qualitative information
given on the risk management system and the risk philosophy would enhance the
information value of financial statements significantly.
While this paper focused on derivative disclosures, outside stakeholders are
interested in the overall return and risk situation of a financial institution. Therefore,
what is sought is not inordinate detail on the risk and return of specific instruments
or positions, but illuminating disclosures that help to assess the company's risk and
return. Hence, the reported VAR and credit concentrations should ideally refer to
the whole company, taking into consideration both cash instruments and off-
balance-sheet relationships. Credit exposures and probabilities of default, on the
other hand, should be disclosed separately for derivatives and for other financial
instruments. In this case, separate disclosure increases the information value, since
exposures from derivatives activities are more volatile than those of conventional
loans.
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